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Abstract
I argue here that the debate over the causal status of natural selection, genetic
dri, and tness has foundered on an unrecognized issue in the metaphysics
of science. Many parts of this debate rely, tacitly or explicitly, on a solution to
what I will call “the causal composition question” – dening the circumstances
in which micro-level causes compose to produce a macro-level causal process.
Further, evolutionary biology constitutes a particularly poor environment in
which to study this general question regarding causation. I thus claim that this
is a place where we must foster engagement between philosophers of biology
and metaphysicians of science.
One of the most heated debates in the literature on the foundations of evolu-
tionary theory over the last een years has concerned whether natural selection and
genetic dri are causal processes.is issue, in turn, has touched on several other core
features of evolutionary theory. Are we right to describe selection, dri, mutation,
migration, and so on as analogous to Newtonian forces, each of which drives a pop-
ulation in a given direction? If we are, which of these should be considered part of
the “inertial” state (analogous to Newton’s rst law), and which should be considered
“special” forces (analogous to Newtonian gravitation and described by the second
law)? If selection is causal, is tness causal as well? Or is tness merely a non-causal
property of organisms, tallied for biological convenience?
Broadly, two positions in this debate have solidied.e “causalist” picture,
canonically stated by Sober (1984), considers selection and dri to be causal processes,
which in many cases can protably be compared with Newtonian forces.e “statis-
ticalist” interpretation, which was inaugurated by Walsh et al. (2002) and Matthen
and Ariew (2002), disagrees. On this interpretation, selection, dri, and tness are
all non-causal. Rather, they are simply useful statistical summaries of the genuinely
causal events that occur at other (individual, genetic, biochemical) ontological levels.1
e force analogy, the statisticalists argue, breaks down, particularly in the case of
genetic dri.
Auseful way to characterize these two positions inmore detail is, in fact, to begin
with what isn’t at stake. Both sides grant an identical conception of the individual-level
1. I am cognizant of the trouble with ontological “levels” talk (see, e.g., Eronen, 2015, pp. 39–40 for
a helpful survey of these worries). I don’t, however, think the idea that natural selection, if it is a
genuine causal process, is in some sense composed of causal events involving individual organisms
or their biochemistry is especially controversial. I also must note that I am forced by considerations
of length to smooth over a variety of dierences within each of the statisticalist and causalist views,
which are by no means monolithic.
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causal account of the biological world. Individuals live and die, they are predated,
they mutate, they give birth to other individuals. All of these are causal events, all are
known to occur, and all are, in some sense or another that remains to be specied,
“responsible for” the higher-level phenomena that we call natural selection and genetic
dri.
is commonality is best illustrated by a brief comparison. Matthen and Ariew,
from the statisticalist camp, state explicitly that at the individual level, “we do not
want to debate . . . whether dierences in tness-relevant traits actually played a role
in evolution” (Matthen and Ariew, 2009, p. 203). Shapiro and Sober, on the causalist
side, hold that the appropriate supervenience base for natural selection includes
some subset of “the causal processes that impinge on individual organisms” (Shapiro
and Sober, 2007, p. 251). It is clear, then (modulo some supercial dierences in
terminology), that both sides suppose that happenings in the lives and deaths of
individual organisms are causal, and that these in some way result in evolutionary
change.
Second, it is granted that natural selection and genetic dri (and, hence, evolu-
tionary change in general) are phenomena that demand probabilistic explanations,
and they are expressible mathematically as a set of statistical trends that exist within
populations of organisms.is is a foundational part of the statisticalist picture. Of
the causalists, Hodge’s (1987) position perhaps makes this most clear – selection and
dri just are varieties of sampling for Hodge, and this sampling is best described by
the statistical formulation of traditional population genetics.
is, it would seem, is a fairly robust picture of the biological world. We have
agreement on both the underlying causes that (in some way or another) constitute
the evolutionary process, and on the broad structure of the statistical framework that
must be used to describe population change over time. What, then, remains at stake,
aer this description of the world is agreed upon?
I will consider here one signicant issue which persists – and argue that it forms
a major part of the intractability of this debate.2e causalist/statisticalist debate
depends on a resolution to the following general worry: in which circumstances
do the organism- and biochemical-level causes agreed upon by both sides compose
to produce causal processes of natural selection, genetic dri, and so on, active at
“higher” ontological levels?3is, in turn, is just a specication of a general question
that arises in the metaphysics of science. When do causes at a lower level combine in
such a way as to produce a causal process active at a higher level? I will call this the
causal composition question (or CCQ).4
Before we begin, I should quickly justify why I take this to be a novel and
important contribution to the debate. First, as we will see below, the metaphysics
of science is not frequently discussed directly in the literature in the philosophy of
biology – these questions are normally approached only obliquely, via generalization
from biological cases. Second, while there is some literature that has come close
2. One further question must, unfortunately, fall outside the scope of this paper: dierences over the
very denitions of natural selection and genetic dri themselves. I hope to explore this in future
work.
3.is is not to say that the causalist/statisticalist debate reduces to one over causal composition: this
would mean that there are no peculiarities at all introduced by the biological facts of the matter, a
claim that it will be clear I reject in the following.
4. It has also been termed an instance of “epiphenomenalism” by Shapiro and Sober (2007), about
which more later.
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to discussing CCQ, albeit in dierent terms (about which more later), considering
this question explicitly will, I argue, give us the opportunity to cultivate a novel
and productive relationship between the philosophy of biology and the metaphysics
of science. To start evaluting the role of CCQ, then, we should consider how the
participants in this debate dene the more fundamental notion of a causal process.
1. Identifying Causal Processes
A number of authors have oered accounts of how we might identify causal processes
– or, to put the question more clearly, how we might dierentiate genuinely causal
processes from mere sequences of events that do not cohere suciently to qualify
as a causal process. Salmon (1984, 1994) and Dowe (1992, 1995) take the notion of
‘process’ to be an undened primitive, and separate causal processes from non-causal
processes by considering the transmission and conservation of quantities through
these processes over time. Chakravartty (2007, p. 108) oers a more robustly realist ac-
count, on which causal processes consist of the continuous interaction of manifesting
causal dispositional properties.
ese views have, to some degree, been explicitly considered in the philosophy
of biology. Millstein (2013), for example, has endorsed the Salmon account. Matthen
and Ariew, on the other hand, seem to have a more stringent criterion in mind,
on which natural selection fails to be a causal process because “it is not a process in
which the earlier events cause the latter” (2002, p. 79). Although this view is minimally
spelled out,Matthen has argued elsewhere (2011) that a causal processmust have either
“an overarching cause that is responsible for each event in the sequence, and the order
in which they occur,” or be such that each event in the sequence is causally responsible
for future events in the sequence.5 (Whether this is partial causal responsibility or
complete causal responsibility is le unspecied.)
It is clear that this distinction makes a signicant dierence. Consider a par-
ticularly nebulous process, such as the urbanization of twentieth-century America.
On a more minimal account like that of Salmon or Dowe, this may well qualify as a
causal process, if we can establish the entities involved and the quantities preserved
across time. On the more demanding denition of Matthen and Ariew, however, this
may well not be a causal process, if it is the result of a constellation of diuse causes,
none of which can integrate the various states in a suciently tightly-knit manner.
When we apply this worry about causal processes to the biological world in
particular, this vagueness in denition remains problematic. A lower threshold for
what counts as a causal processmaywell incline one to be a causalist (asmore processes,
perhaps with selection and dri among them, will qualify as causal), while a higher
threshold may support a statisticalist position.
One might worry that this lack of clarity on the denition of a causal process
threatens the entire discussion of CCQ that I hope to pursue here. Without a stable
and suciently shared denition of a causal process, there may not even be a sense in
5. Matthen has suggested to me (pers. comm.) that the denition of causal process intended in the
earlier Matthen and Ariew (2002) is Salmon’s, but it is not clear that Salmon’s view is consistent with
the quote above. More recent statisticalist work (Walsh et al., 2017) has argued that whatever notion
of causal process is in play, the analytic, statistical inference from trait tnesses to population change
is incompatible with it.is latter claim rests, as well, on unspecied features of the analysis of causal
processes.
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which we can have a debate over whether or not selection and dri are in fact causal. I
want to respond to this objection in two dierent ways. First, part of the debate about
whether or not events qualify as a casual process just is an argument about CCQ.e
example that I briey sketched above concerning urbanization is in part a question
of whether or not a higher-level process of urbanization emerges from lower-level
events (movements of people, construction of cities, etc.). In that sense, debate over
the denition of a causal process feeds into debate about CCQ, and vice versa.
Second, insofar as I don’t have the space (and, as I will argue below, appropriate
theoretical resources) here to resolve CCQ, the kind of interplay that I will consider
below between the metaphysics of science and the philosophy of biology will oer us
equally powerful ways in which we might help resolve the question of the nature of
causal processes. My choice to emphasize CCQ rather than this denitional concern
arises, in part, because CCQ is broadly unconsidered in the philosophy of biology
literature, and will remain even aer this denitional question is resolved.
In what follows, then, I will take a loosely dened, common-sense notion of a
causal process rather than adopting a more formal notion like that of Salmon and
Dowe. As it turns out, this will suce for introducing and elucidating the stakes of
CCQ.
2. Multi-Level Causal Systems
is much should already lead us to think that issues in the metaphysics of science
have a very signicant impact upon the causalist/statisticalist debate. But we can
make the worry here signicantly more precise. When we look at many of the specic
arguments oered by both sides, we will see that they primarily concern not the
specics of the case of dri and selection, but the circumstances, in general, in which
a set of lower-level causal events constitutes a higher-level causal process, which I
have termed the causal composition question.6 Let’s consider three such arguments in
turn.
Individual-level causal selection is a category mistake. Several causalist readings
of natural selection place the causal action at the level of individual organisms (e.g.,
Hodge, 1987; Bouchard and Rosenberg, 2004). Walsh et al. (2002) oer an argument
to the eect that this move is a category mistake. Selection, they argue, is a sorting
process. And sorting “is not a force that causes a coin to fall head or tail” – rather, the
sorting outcome “is explained and predicted by appeal to some statistical property
[of the sequence], an average of individual propensities” (Walsh et al., 2002, p. 463).
We therefore commit a category mistake if we attempt to “point to one or other of
these individual-level causal processes and say this is a cause of the error and this one
is a cause of sorting” (Walsh et al., 2002, p. 465).
The causal interpretation fails to understand population subdivisions. Consider
a coin-tossing example in which two coins are tossed 50 times each (Walsh, 2007, p.
293).7e tosses are performed ten at a time by two experimenters – Walsh provides
6. I will consider arguments grounded more directly in biological facts below.
7. It is interesting to note (in connection with my claim below that these arguments are non-biological)
that while several initial expressions of this argument were phrased in biological terms (Walsh et al.,
2002; Walsh, 2004; Pigliucci and Kaplan, 2006), the most recent (and clearest) version comes from
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simulated data for such an experiment. Now, Walsh writes, “[t]here are at least three
dierent, equally legitimate ways to describe this process” (2007, p. 293): (1) a single
series of coin tosses, 49 heads and 51 tails; (2) two series of 50 tosses, 20/30 and 29/21;
and (3) 10 series of 10 tosses, ranging from 5/5 to 7/3. If dri is just the analogue of
sampling error in this experiment, then, Walsh argues, the causal interpretation “is
committed to the claim that dri-the-cause is strong in the aggregate of 10 sequences
of 10 tosses,” as well as the claim that “[i]n the single sequence of 100 tosses, however,
dri is not very strong at all. But these are not two populations; they are dierent ways
of describing the same population” (Walsh, 2007, p. 296, original emphasis).us a
causal notion of dri is both strong and not-strong in the same population, a supposed
contradiction.
Northcott (2010, pp. 459–460) provides a causalist rebuttal to this argument. He
has us imagine 100 slaves pushing a large rock in service of the pharaoh.e pharaoh
is impressed by uniformity of eort and angered by lack of uniformity, so the higher
the variance of the pushes applied by the laborers, the more the pharaoh will become
angry. We may plausibly say, in such a case, that the variance of the 100 pushes causes
the pharaoh’s anger.is cause has exactly the same strange property with respect to
subdivisions as genetic dri did in the example described above – the pharaoh should
be angrier (on the average, at least) at smaller groups of workers than he should be at
the group as a whole. But this doesn’t necessarily entail that the variance of the group
as a whole somehow fails to cause the pharaoh’s anger.
Selection is a spontaneous statistical tendency, not a force. Matthen and Ariew
(2009) lay out and critique a particular picture of the causal interpretation, one which
they claim derives from Sober (1984). On this view, natural selection exists as an
intervening step in the causal diagram of any evolutionary process – variation in traits
causes selection, which in turn causes the births and deaths of animals responsible
for evolutionary change. Such a “tertium quid,” they argue, is unnecessary. Consider a
series of tosses of a coin biased toward heads.ey claim that “[t]he bias implies that
it is probable, in a series of tosses of this coin, that heads will come up more oen
than tails. No process of ‘toss selection’ is needed for this result”(Matthen and Ariew,
2009, p. 206).e addition of a causally potent natural selection (on this reading of
the causal interpretation) is therefore superuous.
What’s the point in discussing these three arguments? One feature of them,
I think, stands out – or should. None of them are phrased with any reference to
actual biological instances of dri and selection. In this and many other arguments
relating to the causal ecacy of selection and dri, we see apple carts (Walsh, 2007),
Newtonian gravitation, centers of mass (Matthen and Ariew, 2009), pharaoh’s laborers
(Northcott, 2010), scatter plots, smoking, heart disease, painkillers (Walsh, 2010), race
cars (Ramsey, 2016), and (many, many) coin ips.
In and of itself, of course, this is not necessarily a problem. Philosophers oen
draw analogies with various kinds of generalized cases in order to bring important
considerations or morals extracted from them back to the original question at issue.
In this case, however, I believe something more problematic is in fact taking place. For
all of the varied analogies that are deployed, attempting to harness intuitions arising
in a number of other domains, the debate over causation in evolutionary theory has
Walsh (2007), in which he uses the example of a coin-tossing experiment.
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t0 t1 t2
A
B
H(CC)
M(X) Y?
M(X) Y?
H(MSB(X))
Figure 1: Two ways to test for the presence of a cause. H(X) represents holding
condition X xed, M(X) represents manipulating X. CC are the common causes of
X and the later event Y , andMSB(X) is the micro-level supervenience base of the
macro-level phenomenon X.e boxed arrow holds with nomological necessity, and
the question-marked arrow is the causal relation to be studied. Aer gure 5 from
Shapiro and Sober (2007).
remained persistently intractable. And the targets of these various analogies seem to
be clustered around a particular, general question in the metaphysics of multi-level
causation, rather than a problem in the philosophy of biology.e debate, that is,
seems to have been circling around a central question in the metaphysics of science
without, in general, having engaged with metaphysics directly.
e clearest connection between the biological debate and a broader question
about causation comes from Shapiro and Sober (2007).ey consider both the causal-
ist/statisticalist debate and that over epiphenomenalism of mental properties in the
philosophy of mind – arguing that the question of mental epiphenomenalism and
CCQ are two sides of the same coin. In essence, they claim, both of these boil down
to a dispute over how to appropriately perform a manipulation to test whether or not
a macro-level cause is present (see gure 1).
In both cases, we want to know whether or not manipulating the macro-level
event X (at time t1) will result in a change in the macro-level event Y (at time t2).e
question, Shapiro and Sober argue, is what we hold xed in order to bring this manip-
ulation about in the appropriate way. Two obvious possibilities present themselves.
First, we could hold xed the prior (at some earlier time t0) common causes of X and
Y (called CC in the gure) – this is “option A.” Alternatively, we could hold xed the
micro-level supervenience base of X (calledMSB(X) in the gure) – this is “option B.”
ey argue that adopting option B amounts to considering something nomologically
impossible: considering whether or not Y would occur if a nomologically-connected
sucient condition for X occurred (namely,MSB(X)), but X did not. Option A is
thus the correct choice.e statisticalists, they hope to show, have argued on the basis
of option-B analyses of selection and dri, while causalists have argued (correctly)
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from option-A analyses.
Whatever the merits of this particular argument about manipulability turn out
to be,8 Sober and Shapiro have correctly identied what type of case we are dealing
with. CCQ is a general concern within the domain of the metaphysics of science, to
be analyzed using our best theories about causation and supervenience in multi-level
systems.
It is important to note that I do not intend to claim that there is a sharp dividing
line between questions that are metaphysical and those that lie within the domain of
the philosophy of science. (I am not even certain that either category can be clearly
dened.) Rather, the contrast here is one of methods and general approach. When we
ask for a detailed conceptual analysis of a concept arising in evolutionary theory, we
turn, in general, to those who work in the philosophy of biology. When we ask for the
expertise relevant to resolving general questions about relationships of multi-level
causation, on the other hand, we turn, in general, to those who work in metaphysics –
as, I will argue, we should do more oen in the case at issue.
2.1. Resolving the Debate Without CCQ
Onemight object here that a number of authors have claimed to have oered complete,
causal reconstructions of an approach to this debate, which have not involved directly
addressing CCQ. In particular, these authors have attempted to present a causalist
picture that operates only at the population level, thus rendering the question of
composition from the individual level superuous. If that’s true, then one might
argue that CCQ is at best an interesting but unnecessary side-note to the broader
causalist/statisticalist debate.9
I want to close this section, then, by briey sketching the view of Reisman
and Forber, as a representative example. I will argue that while one might consider a
portion of the debate resolved by population-only interpretations, the question of the
relationship between the individual and population levels will remain, and as long as
it does, a response of some sort to CCQ will be required.
In short, Reisman and Forber (2005) argue that a manipulationist view of
causation, when applied to population-level evolutionary phenomena,will – at least for
certain kinds of examples, which they describe in somedetail – give us the possibility of
clean “interventions,” inWoodward’s sense (2003).e existence of such interventions
– systematically alter the founder eect, as Dobzhansky and Pavlovsky did in a real
population, and you will control the strength of dri, which in turn will alter future
population composition – indicates that genetic dri is a causal process (and, by
analogy, natural selection is as well). Indeed, one strength of these manipulations
is taken to be that they never “attempted to identify how selection and dri cause
individual births or deaths” (Reisman and Forber, 2005, p. 1119).
e question is whether this solely population-level story can really remain
so under increased scrutiny. I don’t think it can. Consider their approach to natural
selection. Imagine, they write, that we were to “change the tness structure . . . such
8. In particular, one might be worried that the analogy between epiphenomenalism in philosophy
of mind and selection and dri is defective. If the philosophy of mind example concerns whether
micro-level determinates instantiate (or not) macro-level determinables, rather than causation, then
it, unlike the biological case, may well have an a priori answer.anks to Anjan Chakravartty and
Mohan Matthen for pointing out this objection.
9. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing this objection.
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that one homozygous type had the greatest tness” (Reisman and Forber, 2005, p. 1119).
How is this type tness to be understood? Reisman and Forber don’t say. Traditionally,
type tnesses in causal interpretations of evolutionary theory are taken to be derived
from individual tnesses, which in turn estimate the ability of individual organisms
to survive and reproduce in particular contexts. Intervening on population tnesses
without intervening on these individual abilities to survive and reproduce is a tall
order; if this is what Reisman and Forber really mean here, we need an account of how
it is possible. Otherwise, interventions on natural selection will implicate, whether
we like it or not, changes at the individual level – and thus we need a story about
how those individual changes are related to population changes, which will entail
understanding how those individual-level and population-level causes are related.
In short, given that evolving populations are composed of individuals, and
it is individuals that engage in classic behaviors like eating, mating, and dying, I
nd it unlikely that we will be able to construct a “free-oating,” population-level
understanding of the causal structure for evolution that thereby avoids embroiling
itself in CCQ.
3. Analyzing Causal Composition
e mere fact that we have identied a metaphysical question within a debate in
the philosophy of biology is, in itself, rather unsurprising. Biological systems are
causally complex, and hence we should expect that their structures could oer up
novel challenges to general work on causation.e question we must turn to, then,
is one of the relationship envisioned between CCQ and the question of the causal
structure of evolution in particular. I can see three ways in which we might envision
such a relationship. On the rst, work in the philosophy of biology as it exists now
could be used to inform the debate on CCQ in the metaphysics of science. Second,
work in current metaphysics of science on CCQ could be used to directly inform
the debate over causation in evolution. And third, we might envision a new kind of
interaction, where the two elds work collaboratively to resolve both CCQ in general
and the biological case in particular. I will argue for the third, aer dispensing with
the rst two.
3.1. Applying Extant Biology to Metaphysics
We will not, I claim, be able to directly apply work in the philosophy of biology as it is
currently found to the general problem of CCQ. Consider two possible ways in which
we could do so. We could choose to invoke either complex biological case studies –
“reading o” the metaphysics from the biology – or we could simplify them in a bid
to get the biological cases to map more clearly onto metaphysical questions. Neither
avenue is promising.
First, consider a turn toward biological practice, extracting the correct answers
to our metaphysical worries from the use of biological theories in real-world examples
from the scientic literature. One strand within the debate over the causal status of
evolutionary theory has in fact attempted to work in this manner, remaining biologi-
cally informed and working out the way in which selection and dri are distinguished
(and, it is argued, used as causes) in evolutionary biology. Most prominent here is the
work of Millstein, who has used examples from the montane willow beetle (Millstein,
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2006), land snails (Millstein, 2008), and the early development of the theory of genetic
dri by Fisher and Wright (Millstein et al., 2009).e eort to bring the debate over
causation back to particular biological contexts is long overdue. But when applied to
CCQ, however, I am skeptical of its chances for success. Millstein herself is all too
cognizant of the limitations of this approach when the questions at issue are as abstract
as these. She notes that her examples can only show that viewing “natural selection
[as] a causal process is consistent with at least some biological practice” (Millstein, 2006,
p. 637, emphasis added), or that “Wright and Fisher had good reason to think that
there were biological processes in nature that needed to be represented in dri models
in order to better track evolutionary changes in a population” (Millstein et al., 2009,
p. 8, emphasis added). In both cases, we see a clear recognition of the diculty of
making metaphysical inferences from the practice of working biologists, whether by
limiting the scope of the inference or speaking merely about the representation of
factors in modeling.
And, I claim, there is a well-grounded philosophical reason for the existence of
this diculty. Several authors, perhaps most persuasively Waters (2011), have made
the point that many practicing biologists are what we might call “toolbox theorists.”
As he puts it:
Perhaps, given the messiness of the world, the ideal theory turns out to
be more like a toolbox than a fundamental framework. Perhaps what
is sometimes thought to be a single concept, such as tness, consists of
a family of concepts, each useful for theorizing about dierent aspects,
parts, or scales of entangled causal processes. (Waters, 2011, p. 240)
Setting aside the accuracy of this view as a broader prescription for science or phi-
losophy as a whole, we have ample evidence that practicing biologists do oen view
their theoretical enterprise in this way. Picking up Waters’s invocation of tness, for
example, the biologist de Jong has reviewed the use of ‘tness’ (in only the restricted
numerical sense familiar from population genetics) in the biological literature, and
covers dozens of tness measures which can be categorized in several ways, and which
feature in several dierent models of the selective process. In her conclusion, however,
she asks the following provocative question:
What is tness supposed tomeasure? Some sort of overall performance or
quality of design or aptness for life, or general adaptedness?is seems to
be a discussion that is standing outside the practice of evolutionary biology.
What we usually ask is how such measures . . . are interrelated, and how
they relate to the change in phenotypic traits. Given knowledge of the life
history of the population, the causes and values of the tness components,
these relations can be spelled out in specicmodels.We need not ask whether
expected time to extinction or genotypic weight is the proper tness measure.
What we would like to know is how they are related in a mechanistic
model for a specied situation. (de Jong, 1994, p. 18, emphasis added)
I have quoted extensively from de Jong because her survey provides a particularly
clear demonstration of toolbox theorizing.e question of the “correct” model of
tness, she argues, lies entirely outside the province of evolutionary biology. Rather,
we take a particular system, with a particular model which species the components
of tness of interest.is model and system, then, provide a context in which we study
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the relationship of the various tness measures we nd in our toolbox. If this is how
practicing biologists view fundamental theoretical concepts like tness, selection, and
dri, then it is a mistake to turn to the biological literature in an attempt to resolve
metaphysical questions such as these factors’ status as causal processes.ere are
simply no fundamental concepts there to analyze.
Perhaps, then, this is not the direction to look in order to apply biological
concerns to CCQ. Consider, rather, how we might reduce the biological cases to their
simpler fundamentals.is is, indeed, common practice as well within the debate.
Philosophers of biology who work at the general or foundational level at which the
causalist/statisticalist debate is situated oen – of necessity – employ particularly
simple models of selection and dri. In the context of these austere biological models,
we can most clearly partition the inuences of selection and dri, forming tractable
thought experiments on which the contributions of the various components of the
evolutionary process can be considered.
is eort, however, suers from a signicant problem of its own. It’s not
clear that we really are still exploring – even approximate – biological cases when
we simplify the biological world to this extent. e precise interplay of selection,
dri, mutation, and migration required to oer a plausible explanation of even a
relatively uncomplicated Mendelian trait like blood type in humans is incredibly hard
to describe in detail.10 As another example, the standard recurrence equations used to
provide predictions for how trait tness aects a population when selection alone is
at work are derived in the context of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. But populations at
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium are highly idiosyncratic – in fact, the standard response
to evolutionary stasis is to invoke powerful stabilizing selection, as noted by McShea
and Brandon (2010, p. 120). Simplifying the biological case enough that it could bring
insights to CCQ therefore runs the risk of removing from it any relevant biological
details – all the while without acknowledging that there is a general metaphysical
problem at issue in the rst place.
us, whether we attempt to do so by way of complicating or simplifying the
biological examples here, it seems as though there is no straightforward way in which
the questions raised in the study of the causal structure of evolutionary theory can be
made to speak directly to CCQ.
e problem can be made all the more acute when we consider that it seems as
though there are areas throughout biology that seem to successfully “work around”
CCQ – that is, they oer us understanding and control of multi-level causal systems,
whether we have a clear philosophical account of CCQ or not. Neuroscience is an
important example (and hence the connection that Shapiro and Sober (2007) make
with the philosophy of mind), but there are others, including in areas as diverse as
the role of random search in foraging theory (Glymour, 2001). e prospects for
creating a generalized theory that begins with biological practice in areas tat are this
profoundly disparate also seem grim.
3.2. Applying Extant Metaphysics to Biology
What about the other direction? Perhaps we can approach our best theories of con-
temporary causation and “read o” the correct solution to the biological case from
10. I thank Mark Jordan for the example as well as for pushing me to consider the impact of biological
complexity on the debate.
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them?
In general, the case here is not much better.ere is, indeed, one small branch
of the literature that has considered questions similar to CCQ, arising from work in
causal graph theory, which builds on the classic work of Spirtes et al. (2001). As Spirtes
and Scheines note, the application of this formalism is rendered problematic when
“two or more variables are deterministic functions of one another, not deliberately,
but because of redundant measurements, or underlying lawlike connections” (2004,
p. 834). Manipulating a biological population would be, in their sense, an “ambiguous
manipulation” – because we have no way of knowing which of the multiply realizable
individual-level structures is responsible for giving rise to the population variables that
we see before us. Unfortunately they do not give us a general algorithm for resolving
these questions, and the proofs available in their work do not seem to include any
that map onto the case of evolutionary theory.
Glymour takes up the same theory to approach the question of mental causa-
tion, or, more precisely, “time series of macroscopic quantities that are aggregates
of microscopic quantities” (2007, p. 330). But the key move with respect to CCQ is
performed rather by picking out the causal roles that macro-level variables play:
e causal role of a system of macroscopic properties is the conditional
independence graph, or diagram, of an aggregation of microscopic prop-
erties, together with the values of any causally relevant parameters; each
macroscopic property is an unknown function of the collection of micro-
scopic properties. (Glymour, 2007, p. 342).
Of course, this does not mean that just any graph we might draw connecting macro-
scopic and microscopic properties will automatically describe a causal role for those
macroscopic properties. As Glymour puts it, “not every way of aggregating to form
macroscopic variables will yield screening o relations that reect a causal structure;
indeed, most ways will not” Glymour (2007, p. 342).is approach thus might be
able to oer us a way in which we could resolve CCQ, by examining in which cases
these macro-level causal roles actually exist.
e details, however, are murky, and I lack the space to pursue such a recon-
struction here. For the moment, I will note only that Otsuka has worked extensively
on the eort to interpret evolutionary theory in terms of such directed causal graphs
(Otsuka, 2016a,b, 2019), with the caveat that this approach has yet to include the
connections between the individual and population levels that would be necessary in
order for Glymour’s understanding of macroscopic causal roles to apply. Much more
work remains to be done here.
To sum up, then, there is surprisingly little literature for us to read o of in
the rst place, excepting some results in causal graph theory (and a literature on the
composition of Newtonian forces, about which more in a moment). It will thus be a
challenge to link extant metaphysical work with CCQ in the evolutionary context.
But further, and forming perhaps a more signicant worry, we nd the inverse
of the problem dealt with at the end of the last subsection. It is so dicult to apply
contemporary theories of causation to an arena as complex as evolution that it is
unlikely, as a result, that any genuine progress on CCQ could be made by appealing to
a few “intuitive” biological examples. It is not “intuitively clear,” for example, even in
these simple cases, whether natural selection satises the criteria of a manipulationist,
counterfactual, or a mechanism-based account of causation, nor should we expect it
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to be.11 And further, intuition can be an unsteady guide in many evolutionary cases.
As mentioned above in the contexts of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and blood type,
cases which seem simple on one axis (population stasis or simple Mendelian heredity,
respectively) can frequently be profoundly complex along other axes, and complex in
ways that produce a very opaque causal structure, making our attempts to apply an
approach to causation perilous.
3.3. A New Form of Engagement
Readers would be forgiven at this point for despairing of the possibility of ever con-
necting results concerning a general question in metaphysics to the particular details
of a case in a complex special science.12 But I believe there is a model to which we
may turn, by which metaphysical and practical questions can engage in a protable,
dialectical growth, a reciprocal engagement which has thus far been entirely absent
from the literature in the philosophy of biology.
As an instance of this possible method, consider the discussion of Newtonian
forces. In taking only a few samples, we can nd a full gamut of papers, ranging
from involvement directly with the science to comparatively “pure” metaphysics.
We see direct discussion of the history of the force concept (Jammer, 1957), or the
way in which we might esh out that concept in great technical detail (Earman and
Friedman, 1973). But we also see conceptual analyses at a more general level (Wilson,
2007), along with eorts to categorize forces at a fairly high level of abstraction (Ellis,
1963). We then move toward the metaphysics of forces themselves (Massin, 2009),
whether or not certain additive forces can be said to really exist (Creary, 1981), or
even Wilson’s connection of the force literature to Horgan’s “superdupervenience”
(Wilson, 2002). Note as well that the publication dates of these articles are eectively
random as we move across this spectrum – we have here a genuine case where issues
are simultaneously being worked out at all levels of explanatory grain, oen by the
same authors, and oen in dialog with one another.
Such an approach, when applied to the case here, would push us to consider a
class of questions – the kinds of generalizations that take up the center of the spectrum
in the force literature – which have been more or less ignored in the debate so far
in the philosophy of biology. For example, where else might the causal composition
question crop up in other sciences? Are there ways in which theories of causation
need to be modied or extended, given that we have a genuine need of an answer to
CCQ in the biological world?
Of course, any particular debate might become unbalanced in either one way or
the other when such a relationship is at issue.is debate, I have claimed, has suered
in virtue of having eectively no connections to the metaphysics of science. Another
arena (one commentator has mentioned the debate over the concept of species as a
possible candidate) might suer on the contrary from too much metaphysics.e
intent, rather, is balance: engagement such as this will cease to be fruitful should it
become too one-sided.
11. For example, see Ariew et al. (2015) for an account of the debate over the applicability of a manipu-
lationist denition of causation in biology, or Pérez-González and Luque (2019) for worries about
the use of mechanism.
12. Readers who do not believe such connections are possible or fruitful in the rst place are encouraged
to stop reading the paper now.
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If such an outcome can be avoided, a reciprocal movement between the ne
details of scientic cases and metaphysical reasoning has the potential, at least, to
oer new perspectives of precisely the sort that might reinvigorate a debate otherwise
desperately in need of a path forward.
4. Objections and Connections
Before I conclude, I should pause to raise one important objection, and draw a number
of connections between the program that I propose here and the work of a number of
other authors.
Other mentions of CCQ. I am not, of course, the only author to have noted the
existence of CCQ in this literature. In a paper which teases apart the debate over the
causal nature of genetic dri into a number of further questions, Plutynski argues that
one such component of the debate is “the metaphysical question: is dri (and, for that
matter, natural selection) an epiphenomenal, or a genuinely supervenient, ‘population-
level’ causal process?” (Plutynski, 2007, pp. 161–162). She notes the existence of debate
over the metaphysics of causation, but does not (as it lies outside her scope) deeply
engage with any literature on the question.
For their part, the statisticalists assert that the composition question is unsolv-
able, without further argument. Matthen and Ariew, for example, write that “there
is no straightforward translation between levels with regard to causal statements”
(2002, p. 63). Matthen notes that an element of the debate concerns “intuitions about
the compositionality of causes” (2009, p. 465), but does not follow up on the details
of anything like CCQ.ere has thus been a general understanding that CCQ is a
relevant question within this literature, but no real progress toward its solution.
Connecting causation and probability. at said, several of the authors involved
in this debate have also been working in neighboring areas of the metaphysics of
science, particularly on the metaphysics of probability, in ways that could perhaps
bear interestingly on CCQ. Following upon the growing recognition that there is a
consistent way to think about objective probability at the macroscopic level, even
in a deterministic world (Ismael, 2009; Lyon, 2011; Ismael, 2011), several authors –
most importantly Abrams (2012; 2015) and Strevens (2011; 2013; 2016) – have oered
compelling pictures of the ways in which causal structures at one level of organization
can give rise to repeatable, objective probabilities at higher levels of organization.
Such work is not, of course, directly targeted at the resolution of CCQ.e
aim, rather, is to oer a clear theoretical and metaphysical basis for the inference to
objective macro-scale probability, which seems to occur in circumstances as diverse
as games of chance, biological populations, and complex systems theory. But it does
seem that this is the trend within the current literature most applicable to the kinds
of general questions that I raise here. Placing this research in dialogue with more
contemporary work on causation might serve as a way in which to advance the debate.
Metaphysics or explanation? Finally, one major objection should be considered. A
number of recent articles, particularly from the statisticalist tradition, have attempted
to shi the focus of the debate. Rather than being a question of the metaphysical
structure of evolutionary theory, wemight think about the debate as being instead over
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the nature of evolutionary explanations. Matthen (2009), for instance, has described a
theory of “statistically abstractive explanation,” on which evolutionary theory deploys
a specic and dierent sort of scientic explanation, by abstracting away from the
details of particular populations. Ariew et al. (2015) have taken a similar approach, as
has Walsh (2013).
On this basis, one might well argue for the rejection of my entire approach here.
e objection would go something like the following.e metaphysics of evolutionary
theory is not complex in the slightest.ere are individual organisms (setting aside,
of course, the diculty of questions about biological individuality), which bear traits
(setting aside, of course, the diculty of questions about delineating and distinguish-
ing traits), and which form populations that change over time. To the extent that
causes impinge on these populations, they are just the everyday sorts of causes that
lead to death and mating and eating and so forth. What is in fact interesting is how
we oer explanations for that population change. What we therefore need is (at the
most general) work in general philosophy of science on the structure of explanations
in statistical theories, or even (at the least general) simply analyses of the in-practice
explanations that biologists oer for population change.
I would respond to this critique in two ways. First, it is not clear that, in fact,
these papers that claim to shi the focus to explanation have indeed done so, and other
works which have been published since have returned the focus to the underlying
metaphysical structure of evolutionary theory.WhenMatthen puts forth his account of
statistically abstractive explanation, this is supposed to be an explanation which is only
applicable in some sorts of circumstances – in other words, the system to be explained
must be structured in such a way that “the reference classes display variability that is
traced to the omission of theoretically inadmissible features” (Matthen, 2009, p. 477),
where these inadmissible features are those that are are deemed irrelevant to the
theoretically contextualized study of the phenomena at issue. But when he turns to
the justication of thismodel, he argues from the causal structure of a particular sort of
coin-ipping processes (about whichmore in a moment; Matthen, 2009, pp. 483–484),
which seems to return our focus to metaphysics.
Further, in theirmost recent “manifesto” description of the statisticalist position,
Walsh et al. (2017) are quite equivocal on this question. On the one hand, they oen
frame their view in terms of, for instance, the dierence between “explaining changes
in trait distribution and explaining the ecological causes of population change” (Walsh
et al., 2017, p. 5). On the other hand, the explicit statement of their position comes in
terms of properties ofmodels of natural selection, a decidedly less explanation-focused
and more metaphysical approach.
As a second avenue of response, even if a shi to explanation was fully executed
by some of the relevant authors, I do not believe that it actually avoids the necessity of
engaging with the kinds of questions that I consider here.13 Matthen is undoubtedly
correct that some kinds of causal inuences are not taken to be theoretically relevant
by practicing population geneticists. But what could be the grounds for a justied
exclusion of such claims from evolutionary explanations? What might give rise to the
dierent approaches that authors have taken to analyzing these explanations, with
Matthen arguing that they exclude the individual-level causes of dri or selection,
whileMillstein (2008) argues that a dierent case study foregrounds such causal links?
It seems inescapable that the justication for such exclusions, particularly if one (as
13. I thank Daniel Swaim for encouraging me to think about this line of response.
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Matthen does) wants to draw an entirely general claim about all evolving populations
from them, will be grounded in the causal structure of the evolving systems at issue –
hence, the return of CCQ.
To put the point dierently, and perhaps more provocatively, one may propose
any number of accounts of scientic explanation, and these may more or less well
track the nature of biological practice. But if one intends to argue in turn not only that
these explanations are present in practice, but that their use is justied, one must have
a suciently clear grasp of the metaphysics of the system being explained to support
such a justication. Such a grasp will require engagement at the sort of general level
that I have discussed here.
5. Conclusions
I hope, therefore, to have argued for the following. An important and underappreci-
ated facet of the debate over the causal status of natural selection and genetic dri is
its reliance on a question from the metaphysics of science: when do causes at one level
compose to produce a causal process at a higher level? We see this most clearly from
the highly generalized examples oen used in discussion of the causalist/statisticalist
debate.is would not, in and of itself, constitute a problem, were it not that – pri-
marily due to the distance between our understanding of CCQ in abstract cases and
the real biological world – selection and dri constitute a particularly poor environ-
ment in which to study CCQ, and vice versa. Following on the literature on classical
mechanics, I then pointed to a model of interaction between philosophers of science
and metaphysical concerns that is, I claim, a possible way out of the morass in which
the debate nds itself.
What, then, does this mean overall? I hope that this constitutes an argument
for increased engagement between philosophers of biology and metaphysicians of
science.14e debate over the fundamental causal structure of evolution can provide
just one of what I suspect are manifold fruitful places for philosophers of biology to
interact with the work being done in the metaphysics of science. If my arguments
here are correct, our prospects for understanding that structure are otherwise rather
bleak.
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